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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between professional demographic factors 
concerning external and internal auditors and the perceived level of effectiveness of the Statement 
of Auditing Standard (SAS) No. 99 red flags in detecting fraudulent financial reporting activities 
as perceived by external and internal auditors. The six hypotheses are: (1) the type of auditors 
using red flags to detect fraud, (2) highest degrees received by auditors, (3) areas that auditors 
majored in at universities, (4) auditors’ accumulated knowledge of red flags, (5) auditors who 
have or have not used red flags to detect fraud, and (6) auditors who have or have not received in-
house red flag training.  The six hypotheses explore how six professional demographic factors 
may influence the level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of the SAS No. 99 red flags as perceived by 
227 external and internal auditors in Iran.  The results of this study indicate that all six 
hypotheses were accepted.   In conclusion, the level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of these red 
flags as perceived by the Iranian auditors may be influenced by the following factors: (1) the type 
of auditors, (2) the highest degrees received by auditors, (3) areas that auditors majored in at 
universities, (4) knowledge about red flags accumulated by auditors, (5) auditors who have or 
have not previously used red flags to detect fraud, and (6) auditors who have or have not 
previously received in-house red flag training.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he objective of this study was to determine the degree of influence that professional demographic 
factors may exert on the level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of red flags in detecting fraudulent 
financial reporting activities as perceived by the external and internal auditors in Iran.    In this study, 
18 professional demographic factors were statistically analyzed as to their possible influence upon Iranian external 
and internal auditors using red flags to detect fraudulent financial activities, while conducting financial statement 
audits of their corporate audit clients.   Statement of Auditing Standard (SAS) No. 99 requires external auditors to 
use 42 red flags in financial statement audits to detect fraudulent financial reporting activities (AICPA, 2009).   
Internal auditors may assist external auditors in conducting financial statement audits, so the extremely high audit 
fees that CPA firms charge their corporate clients may be decreased partially.   From the 227 Iran auditors (external 
and internal) surveyed, a total of 36 red flags were investigated to determine if any of the 18 professional 
demographic factors associated with the auditors appear to influence the level of effectiveness of the 36 red flags to 
detect fraud as perceived by the external and internal auditors surveyed in Iran. 
   
 
T 
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 The 18 professional demographic factors are as follows: (1) gender, (2) type of auditor, (3) age, (4) highest 
degree received, (5) areas that auditors majored in at universities, (6) year of graduation, (7) knowledge of red flags, 
(8) how often auditors use red flags, (9) have auditors used red flags previously to detect fraud, (10) have auditors 
previously attended red flag conferences, (11) have auditors previously received in-house red flag training, (12) 
position or job title of external auditors, (13) position or job title of internal auditors, (14) type of firm employing 
auditors, (15) number of years of internal auditing experience, (16) number of years of external auditing experience, 
(17) number of years of total auditing experience, and (18) do auditors want to teach accounting courses. 
 
 This study explored the relationship between 18 professional demographic factors concerning auditors and 
the level of effectiveness of the 36 SAS No. 99 red flags in detecting fraudulent financial reporting activities as 
perceived by Iranian auditors.    Out of the 18 professional demographic factors, six factors were selected by using 
Cluster Analysis.  The six hypotheses were investigated to determine how the six professional demographic factors 
may influence the level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of these 36 red flags as perceived by 227 external and 
internal auditors surveyed in Iran.  These six professional demographic factors are: (1) the type of auditors, (2) 
highest degrees received by auditors, (3) areas that auditors majored in at universities, (4) accumulated knowledge 
of red flags by auditors, (5) auditors who have or have not previously used red flags to detect fraud, and (6) auditors 
who have or have not previously received in-house red flag training  
    
PRIOR STUDIES 
 
 This Iranian study is very similar to a large study conducted in the United States.   From the American 
study, six articles were previously written and published in journals.  The results and conclusions from the six prior 
articles published can be generally summarized by the following two statements:  First, the level of fraud-detecting 
effectiveness of the 42 SAS No. 99 red flags can be classified by statistical testing into three categories: more 
effective, average effectiveness, and less effective, as perceived by external auditors, internal auditors, and both 
external and internal auditors combined (Moyes, et al., 2005; Moyes et al., 2006b; Moyes et al., 2007; and Moyes, 
2008).  Second, numerous significant differences exist between external and internal auditors concerning their 
perceptions of the level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of each of the 42 SAS No. 99 red flags that are required to 
be used in financial statement audits to detect fraudulent financial reporting activities (Lin et al., 2006; Moyes, 
2006a).  Each of the six articles provided unique and specific results and conclusions that differentiate it from the 
other articles.   
 
 Albrecht and Romney (1986) showed that partners perceived only one-third of the red flags as being 
considered significant predictors of fraud, which tended to be considered as personal characteristics of management 
rather than company-specific factors.  Indicators of fraud concerning management are classified as the SAS No. 99 
Attitude and Rationalization red flags. 
 
Heiman-Hoffman and Morgan (1996) found that red flags did carry different weights as perceived by the 
sample of auditors surveyed and discovered that the auditors tended to rate “management attitudes” as the single 
most important category of red flags when compared to other organizational variables.  They concluded 
management attitudes represented one of the three categories of red flags which are required to be used by external 
auditors in conducting financial statement audits according to the SAS No. 99 (AICPA, 2009). 
 
Apostolou et al. (2001) surveyed both internal and external auditors.  All auditors were requested to 
determine the importance of the 25 red flags included in SAS No. 82 (AICPA, 2009). Both management 
characteristics and the influence over the control environment were considered the highest rated indicators (red 
flags) by the auditors surveyed.  No significant differences were found between internal and external auditors.   
 
Gramling and Myers (2003) examined internal auditors’ perceptions concerning 43 red flags and indicated 
the most important red flags involve factors related to attitude or rationalization.  Out of the top 15 red flags, six 
represented Attitude or Rationalization red flags, three represented Incentive red flags, and six represented 
Opportunity red flags.  In addition, four out of the six Attitude or Rationalization red flags were determined to be 
more important than the other red flags. 
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Pincus (1989) investigated the efficacy of the use of red flags as perceived by auditors and noted that 
approximately half of the respondents indicated that red flag questionnaires assisted auditors in fraud assessment, 
because these auditors considered red flags as very important tools used in the financial statement audits.  For the 
other respondents, one conclusion may be that auditors who do not use red flag questionnaires may indicate they do 
not understand red flags to be good indicators of fraudulent financial activities. 
 
Church et al. (2001) found that internal auditors considered certain red flags to be more probable for 
detecting fraud.  These two red flags are related to income-surpassing expectations and managers’ bonuses based on 
earnings. 
 
RESEARCH MODELS 
 
 In this Iranian study, the following six hypotheses will be statistically tested to be either accepted or 
rejected.   Out of the 18 professional demographic factors, Cluster Analysis selected the six factors for statistical 
analysis, which included the MANOVA.  The six professional demographic factors selected are: (1) type of auditors, 
(2) highest degrees received by auditors, (3) areas that auditors majored in at universities, (4) different amounts of 
knowledge accumulated by auditors about red flags, (5) auditors have or have not used red flags to detect fraud, and 
(6) auditors have or have not received in-house red flag training.  The following six hypotheses were written for the 
six professional demographic factors, which were selected by Cluster Analysis. 
 
Hypothesis 1:   There will be differences in the perceived level of effectiveness of red flags in fraud detection 
between the two types of auditors: external and internal. 
 
Hypothesis 2:   There will be differences in the perceived level of effectiveness of red flags in fraud detection 
among the different types of the highest degrees received by the auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 3:   There will be differences in the perceived level of effectiveness of red flags in fraud detection 
among the different majors declared by the auditors, when they were students at universities. 
 
Hypothesis 4:   There will be differences in the perceived level of effectiveness of red flags in fraud detection 
among the different levels of auditors’ accumulated knowledge about red flags. 
 
Hypothesis 5:   There will be differences in the perceived level of effectiveness of red flags in fraud detection 
between auditors who have detected fraud using red flags and auditors who have not detected 
fraud using red flags. 
 
Hypothesis 6:   There will be differences in the perceived level of effectiveness of red flags in fraud detection 
between auditors who have received in-house red flag training and auditors who have not received 
in-house red flag training. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 The targeted population in this study was a random sample of audit professionals in the country of Iran.  
This study attempted to determine which professional factors influence the level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of 
36 SAS No. 99 red flags as perceived by Iranian external and internal auditors. 
 
 The auditing professionals were surveyed to evaluate the level of effectiveness of the 36 red flags in 
detecting fraud by using a seven-point Likert scale, which measures the auditors’ perceptions of the fraud-detecting 
effectiveness of each of the 36 red flags.  A total of 227 usable questionnaires were collected.  In Iran, 450 red flag 
questionnaires were mailed to external auditors, and another 450 red flag questionnaires were also mailed to internal 
auditors.  As a result, 130 usable questionnaires were collected from the external auditors representing a 29 percent 
response rate, and 91 usable questionnaires were also collected from the internal auditors representing a 20 percent 
response rate. 
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 External and internal auditors’ responses on the questionnaires were entered into a SPSS database.  The 
data collected from questionnaires was analyzed by using the following statistical tests: Factor Analysis, Cluster 
Analysis, and the MANOVA.   Factor analysis was used for data reduction which resulted in the 36 red flags being 
classified into eight factor groups.  Cluster Analysis determined the six out of the 18 professional demographic 
variables which may have significant differences.   Six hypotheses were written for those six demographic variables 
selected.  In using Factor Analysis, the factor scores were saved as variables, which were later used as dependent 
variables in a MANOVA.  Next, the averages of the variables loaded to each factor were saved as variables for 
comparison with the factor score variables.  The MANOVA was used to test the six hypotheses.  Comparisons were 
made between the simple averages of only the variables loaded to a factor and the factor scores. 
 
 For the MANOVA, the dependent variables used for this study represent the level of effectiveness of each 
of the 36 red flags in detecting fraud according to the perceptions of external and internal auditors.  In using the 
MANOVA, the independent variables were: (1) type of auditors, (2) highest degrees received by auditors, (3) areas 
that auditors majored in at universities, (4) accumulated knowledge of red flags by auditors, (5) auditors who have 
or have not used red flags to detect fraud, and (6) auditors who have or have not received in-house red flag training. 
 
 The design of the red flag questionnaire was based on the 36 red flags, which were classified into three 
SAS No. 99 red flag categories: Pressure, Opportunity and Rationalization.  Two types of auditors (external and 
internal) were surveyed to evaluate the effectiveness of each of the 36 red flags in detecting fraud by using a seven-
point Likert scale on the red flag questionnaire.  The composition of the seven-point Likert scale was as follows: (1) 
extremely effective (value of 7), (2) very effective (value of 6), (3) mostly effective (value of 5), (4) somewhat 
effective (value of 4), (5) seldom effective (value of 3), (6) low effective (value of 2), and (7) not effective (value of 
1).    For example, if the auditor indicated a red flag was “extremely effective,” a value of 7 was entered into the 
SPSS database. 
 
RESULTS 
 
 An exploratory Factor Analysis was conducted on the 36 red flags which reduced 36 red flags as variables 
into eight factor groups.   Each factor group was labeled with a name that was descriptive the red flags as variables 
which comprised each factor group.   The names of the eight factor groups and the explanations of the 36 red flags 
are shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3.  The SAS No. 99 requires external auditors, with or without the assistance of internal 
auditors, to use red flags during financial statement audits to detect fraudulent financial reporting activities.  In 
Tables 1, 2, and 3, the factor groups are labeled in the left column, and the red flags are shown in the right column.  
In Tables 1, 2 and 3, PR indicates Pressure red flags, OP indicates Opportunity red flags, and RA indicates 
Rationalization red flags.  In general, the results of this Iran study agreed with the similar results from prior studies 
conducted in the United States (Lin et al., 2006; Moyes et al., 2005; Moyes, 2006a; Moyes et al., 2006b; Moyes et 
al., 2007; and Moyes,  2008). 
 
 Table 1 shows the 13 Pressure (PR) red flags which have been combined into three factor groups by using 
Factor Analysis.  In Table 1, the three factor groups are labeled as: (1) Management Decisions and Market Changes, 
(2) CEOs, Directors and Operating Performance, and (3) Listing/Debt Requirements and Profitability. 
 
 Table 2 shows the 11 Opportunity (OP) red flags, which have been combined into three factor groups by 
using Factor Analysis.  In Table 2, the three factor groups are labeled as: (1) Transactions, Accounts and Estimates, 
(2) Oversight and Monitoring, and (3) Organizational Structure and Controls. 
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Table 1:  13 Pressure Red Flags Combined into Three Factor Groups 
3 Factor Groups 13 Pressure Red Flags 
PR-1: 
Management Decisions 
& Market Changes 
PR-1-1 High vulnerability to rapid changes in technology, product obsolescence, or interest rates 
PR-1-2 Excessive pressure on operating management or personnel to meet financial targets (sales 
and profitability incentive goals) exerted by boards of directors and chief executive officers 
PR-1-3 Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in the industry 
or overall economy 
PR-1-4 Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing of major research and development or 
capital expenditures to stay competitive 
PR-1-5 High degree of competition or market saturation accompanied by declining margins 
PR-1-6 New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements 
PR-1-7 Significant portions of management’s compensation, represented by bonuses and stock 
options, being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for stock price, operating results, 
financial position, or cash flow 
PR-2: 
CEOs, Directors & 
Operating Performance 
PR-2-1 Management and/or board directors holding significant financial interests in the entity 
PR-2-2 Management and/or board directors have personally guaranteed significant debts of the 
firm 
PR-2-3 Recurring negative cash flows from operations or an inability to generate cash flows 
while reporting earnings and earnings growth 
PR-2-4 Operating losses causing threat of imminent bankruptcy or foreclosure, or hostile 
takeover 
PR-3: 
Listing/Debt 
Requirements & 
Profitability 
PR-3-1 Marginal ability to meet exchange listing requirements or debt repayment 
PR-3-2 Rapid growth or unusual profitability, especially compared to that of other companies in 
the same industry 
 
 
Table 2:  11 Opportunity Red Flags Combined into Three Factor Groups 
3 Factor Groups 11 Opportunity Red Flags 
OP-1: 
Transactions, Accounts 
& Estimates 
OP-1-1 Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially occurring close to year 
end that pose difficult “substance over form” questions 
OP-1-2 Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve 
subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate 
OP-1-3 Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with related 
entities that are not audited or audited by another firm 
OP-1-4 Domination of management by a single person or small group in a nonowner-managed 
business without compensating controls 
OP-1-5 Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch operations in tax-haven jurisdictions for 
which there appears to be no clear business justification 
OP-2: 
Oversight & 
Monitoring 
OP-2-1 Ineffective board of directors or audit committee oversight over the financial reporting 
process and internal control system 
OP-2-2 Inadequate monitoring of significant internal controls 
OP-2-3 High turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting, internal audit, or 
information technology staff 
OP-3: 
Organizational 
Structure & Controls 
OP-3-1 High turnover of chief executive officers or board directors 
OP-3-2 Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial 
lines of authority 
OP-3-3 Difficulty in determining the organization or individuals that have controlling interest in 
the entity 
 
  
 Table 3 shows the 12 Rationalization (RA) red flags, which have been combined into two factor groups by 
using Factor Analysis.  In Table 3, the two factor groups are labeled as: (1) Auditors and Managers, and (2) 
Management Involvement. 
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Table 3:  12 Rationalization Red Flags Combined into Two Factor Groups 
2 Factor Groups 12 Rationalization Red Flags 
RA-1: 
Auditors & Managers 
RA-1-1 Unreasonable demands on the auditor, such as unreasonable time constraints regarding the 
completion of the audit or the issuance of the auditor's report 
RA-1-2 Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting, auditing, or 
reporting matters 
RA-1-3 Domineering management behavior in dealing with the auditor, especially involving 
attempts to influence the scope of the auditor's work 
RA-1-4 Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that inappropriately limit his access to 
people or information or limit his ability to communicate effectively with the board of directors or 
the audit committee 
RA-1-5 A practice used by management of committing to analysts, creditors, and other third 
parties to achieve aggressive or unrealistic forecasts 
RA-1-6 Known history of violations of securities law, or claims against the entity, its senior 
management, or board directors alleging fraud or violations of securities laws 
RA-1-7 An interest by management employing inappropriate means to minimize reported earnings 
for tax-motivated reasons 
RA-1-8 Management failure to correct known reportable conditions in internal controls in a timely 
basis 
RA-2: 
Management 
Involvement 
RA-2-1 Ineffective communication, implementation, support, or enforcement of the entity's values 
or ethical standards by management or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical 
standards 
RA-2-2 Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity's stock price or 
earnings trend 
RA-2-3 Nonfinancial management's excessive participation in the selection of accounting 
principles or the determination of significant estimates 
RA-2-4 Recurring attempts by management to justify marginal or inappropriate accounting on the 
basis of materiality 
 
  
 All eight factor groups shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3 were used in the data analysis.  In Tables 1, 2, and 3, 
these eight factor groups are classified into the three following SAS No. 99 categories: (1) Pressure red flags 
indicated by PR, (2) Opportunity red flags indicated by OP and (3) Rationalization red flags indicated by RA.  In 
addition, the 36 red flags are also shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3. 
   
Hypothesis 1:  Professional Demographic Factor - Type of Auditors (External and Internal) 
 
 In the first hypothesis, it is proposed that different types of Iranian auditors (external and internal) will have 
different levels of perceived effectiveness for each of the 36 red flags.  In this study, 91 internal auditors and 130 
external auditors completed usable red flag questionnaires, from which the SPSS database was established for data 
analysis.  The MANOVA, which used factor scores, is shown in Table 4.  As a professional demographic factor, the 
type of auditors influences the perceived level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of three red flag factor groups: (1) PR 
FacScore2: CEOs, Directors and Operating Performance, (2) OP FacScore2: Oversight and Monitoring, and (3) OP 
FacScore3: Organizational Structure and Controls.  Three factor groups include 10 red flags, of which seven red 
flags are significant and three red flags are marginally significant.    
 
 
Table 4:  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects using Factor Scores 
Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F 
Value Sig. 
PR FacScore2 - CEO, Directors & Operating Performance 7.442 1 7.442 7.596 .006 
OP FacScore2 - Oversight & Monitoring 2.702 1 2.702 2.804 .095 
OP FacScore3 - Organizational Structure & Controls 6.915 1 6.915 7.213 .008 
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The MANOVA using simple averages of the factor groups is shown in Table 5.  In reference to Table 5, the 
type of auditors influences the perceived level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of two red flag factor groups: (1) 
CEOs, Directors and Operating Performance, and (2) Organization Structure and Controls.  These two groups 
included seven red flags, which are all significant. 
 
 
Table 5:  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects using Simple Averages of Factors 
Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F 
Value Sig. 
PR FacAverage2 – CEOs, Directors & Operating Performance 4.700 1 4.700 5.235 .023 
OP FacAverage3 - Organizational Structure & Controls 4.439 1 4.439 5.950 .015 
 
  
In Table 6, external and internal auditors are compared using simple averages of the factors for both the 
CEOs, Directors and Operating Performance and Organizational Structure and Control factor groups. 
 
 
Table 6:  Pair-wise Comparisons Using Simple Averages of Factors 
 
 
In summary, Hypothesis 1 was accepted.  Significant or marginally significant differences between external 
and internal auditors exist for the three following red flag factor groups: (1) CEOs, Directors and Operating 
Performance, (2) Oversight and Monitoring, and (3) Organizational Structure and Controls.  For both the CEOs, 
Directors and Operating Performance and Organizational Structure and Control factor groups, external auditors 
perceived these red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than internal auditors as shown in Table 6. 
 
In the CEOs, Directors and Operating Performance factor group, the following four Pressure red flags were 
perceived to be more effective in fraud detection by external auditors than internal auditors: (1) PR-2-1: 
Management and/or board directors holding significant financial interests in the entity; (2) PR-2-2: Management 
and/or board directors having personally guaranteed significant debts of the firm; (3) PR-2-3: Recurring negative 
cash flows from operations or an inability to generate cash flows while reporting earnings and earnings growth; and 
(4) PR-2-4: Operating losses causing threat of imminent bankruptcy or foreclosure, or hostile takeover. 
 
The following three Opportunity red flags in the Organizational Structure and Controls factor group were 
perceived to be more effective in fraud detection by external auditors than internal auditors: (1) OP-3-1: High 
turnover of chief executive officers or board directors; (2) OP-3-2: Overly complex organizational structure 
involving unusual legal entities or managerial lines of authority; and (3) OP-3-3: Difficulty in determining the 
organization or individuals that have controlling interest in the entity.  
 
In the Oversight and Monitoring factor group, the following three Opportunity red flags were perceived to 
have different levels of effectiveness but did not represent significant differences: (1) OP-2-1: Ineffective boards of 
directors or audit committee oversight over the financial reporting process and internal control system; (2) OP-2-2: 
Inadequate monitoring of significant internal controls and (3) OP-2-3: High turnover rates or employment of 
ineffective accounting, internal audit, or information technology staff. 
 
The significant differences between external and internal auditors concerning the level of fraud detecting 
effectiveness of each of the 36 red flags are similar to the results of the American study.   In the United States, 
numerous significant differences were found between external and internal auditors concerning their perceptions of 
Dependent 
Variable 
Auditor 
Type 
(I) 
Auditor 
Type 
(J) 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
External Auditors Internal Auditors .293* .128 .023 .041 .546 
External Auditors Internal Auditors .285* .117 .015 .055 .515 
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the level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of each of the 42 SAS No. 99 red flags that are required to be used in 
financial statement audits to detect fraudulent financial reporting activities (Lin et al., 2006; Moyes et al., 2007).   
 
Hypothesis 2:  Professional Demographic Factor – Highest Degrees Received by Auditors 
 
 In the second hypothesis, it is proposed that differences exist in the perceived level of effectiveness of each 
of the 36 red flags in fraud detection among the different highest degrees (Associate, Bachelor’s, Master’s, and 
Ph.D.) received by the Iranian auditors.  As a professional demographic factor, the highest degrees received by 
auditors were classified into four different categories: (1) Associate degrees received by 3 auditors, (2) Bachelor’s 
degrees by 132 auditors, (3) Master of Science degrees received by 77 auditors, and (4) Ph.D.s received by 9 
auditors.  The MANOVA, which used factor scores, is shown in Table 7.  As a professional demographic factor, 
highest degrees received by auditors influence the perceived level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of one red flag 
factor group known as the Management Decisions and Market Changes, which includes seven red flags that all are 
significant.  In other words, auditors with Master of Science degrees and auditors with Bachelor’s degrees perceived 
each of seven red flags to have different levels of fraud-detecting effectiveness.    
 
 
Table 7:  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Using Factor Scores 
Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F 
Value Sig. 
PR FacScore1 - Management Decisions & Market Changes  
12.323 
 
3 
 
4.108 
 
4.262 
 
.006 
 
  
In Table 8, the Scheffe test using factor scores compares the Associate degrees with the Bachelor’s, 
Master’s and Ph.D. degrees for the seven red flags in the Management Decisions and Market Changes factor group.   
 
 
Table 8:  Multiple Comparisons Using Factor Scores with the Scheffe Test 
Dependent 
Variable 
College 
Degree 
(I) 
College 
Degree 
(J) 
 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
PR FacScore1 -Management 
Decisions & Market Changes 
Associate 
Degree 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
1.0308430 .57322126 .359 -.5842393 2.6459253 
Master of 
Science 
.6439054 .57775272 .743 -.9839446 2.2717553 
Ph.D. .3156004 .65450315 .972 -1.5284980 2.1596989 
 
 
The MANOVA, which used simple averages of factor groups, is shown in Table 9.  As a professional 
demographic factor, the highest degrees received by auditors influenced the perceived level of fraud-detecting 
effectiveness of two red flag factor groups: (1) Management Decisions and Market Changes and (2) Organizational 
Structure and Controls.  These two factor groups included 10 red flags that are all significant.   
 
 
Table 9:  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Using Simple Averages of Factors 
Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F 
Value Sig. 
PR FacAverage1 - Management Decisions & Market Changes 6.775 3 2.258 3.470 .017 
OP FacAverage3 - Organizational Structure & Controls 6.165 3 2.055 2.857 .038 
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 In Table 10, the Scheffe test, using simple averages of factors, compares the Associate degrees with the 
Bachelor’s, Master’s and Ph.D. degrees for the Management Decisions and Market Changes factor group.  For the 
Organizational Structure and Control Factor group, the Scheffe test, using simple averages of factors, compares the 
Ph.D. degrees with the Associate’s, Bachelor’s, and Master’s degrees.  
 
 
Table 10:  Multiple Comparisons Using Simple Averages of Factors with the Scheffe Test 
Dependent 
Variable 
College 
Degree 
(I) 
College 
Degree 
(J) 
 95% Confidence Interval 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
PR FacAverage1 - 
Management Decisions 
& Market Changes 
Associate 
Degree 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
.7676 .47098 .449 -.5591 2.0944 
Master of 
Science Degree 
.5653 .47430 .701 -.7709 1.9014 
Ph.D. .0635 .53781 1.000 -1.4515 1.5785 
OP FacAverage3- 
Organizational Structure and 
Control 
Ph.D Associate 
Degree 
.3704 .56535 .934 -1.2223 1.9630 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
.7096 .29208 .120 -.1133 1.5324 
Master of 
Science Degree 
.4794 .29797 .461 -.3600 1.3188 
 
 
In summary, Hypothesis 2 was accepted.  Significant differences among the four different types of highest 
degrees (Associate, Bachelor’s, Master’s and Ph.D.) received by Iranian auditors exist for the two following red flag 
factor groups: (1) Management Decisions and Market Changes, and (2) Organizational Structure and Controls.   
These two factor groups included 10 red flags, which are explained in the following two paragraphs.   
  
 For the Management Decisions and Market Changes factor group shown in Tables 8 and 10, the results are 
explained by the three following statements: (1) Auditors with Associate degrees perceived these red flags as being 
more effective in detecting fraud than the auditors with Ph.D.s; (2) Auditors with Ph.D.s perceived these red flags as 
being more effective in detecting fraud than the auditors with Master of Science degrees; and (3) Auditors with 
Master of Science degrees perceived these red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than the auditors with 
Bachelor’s degrees.  The seven Pressure red flags included in the Management Decisions and Market Changes factor 
group are: (1) PR-1-1: High vulnerability to rapid changes in technology, product obsolescence, or interest rates; (2) 
PR-1-2: Excessive pressure on operating management or personnel to meet financial targets (sales and profitability 
incentive goals) exerted by boards of directors and chief executive officers; (3) PR-1-3: Significant declines in 
customer demand and increasing business failures in the industry or overall economy; (4) PR-1-4: Need to obtain 
additional debt or equity financing of major research and development or capital expenditures to stay competitive; 
(5) PR-1-5: High degree of competition or market saturation accompanied by declining margins; (6) PR-1-6: New 
accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements; and (7) PR-1-7: Significant portions of management’s 
compensation, represented by bonuses and stock options, being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for 
stock price, operating results, financial position, or cash flow. 
 
For the Organizational Structure and Controls factor group shown in Table 8, the results are explained by 
the three following statements: (1) Auditors with Ph.D.s perceived these red flags as being more effective in 
detecting fraud than the auditors with Associate degrees; (2) Auditors with Associate degrees perceived these red 
flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than the auditors with Master of Science degrees; and (3) Auditors 
with Master of Science degrees perceived these red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than the auditors 
with Bachelor’s degrees.  The three Opportunity red flags included in the Organizational Structure and Controls 
factor group are: (1) OP-3-1: High turnover of chief executive officers or board directors; (2) OP-3-2: Overly 
complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial lines of authority; and (3) OP-3: 
Difficulty in determining the organization or individuals that have controlling interest in the entity.  
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 Approximately 35 percent of all the auditors surveyed graduated with Master of Science degrees and 4 
percent with Ph.D. degrees.   In general, the more educated auditors perceived these red flags as being more 
effective in detecting fraud than the less educated auditors. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  Professional Demographic Factor – Areas that the Auditors Majored in at Universities  
 
 In the Hypothesis 3, it is proposed that differences exist in the perceived level of effectiveness of each of 
the 36 red flags in detecting fraud among the different areas that auditors majored in at universities.  As a 
professional demographic factor, the four areas that the Iranian auditors majored in at universities are: (1) 146 
auditors majoring in Accounting, (2) 51 auditors majoring in Management, (3) 15 auditors majoring in Economics, 
and (4) 9 auditors majoring in other areas.  The MANOVA, which used factor scores, is shown in Table 11.  As a 
professional demographic factor, areas that auditors majored in at universities influenced the perceived level of 
fraud-detecting effectiveness of one red flag factor group known as CEOs, Directors and Operating Performance.   
This factor group includes four Pressure red flags, which are all marginally significant. 
 
 
Table 11:  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Using Factor Scores 
Dependent 
Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F 
Value Sig. 
PR FacScore2 - CEOs, Directors & Operating Performance 6.539 3 2.180 2.195 .090 
 
  
In Table 12, the Scheffe test, using factor scores, compares the Accounting degrees with the Management, 
Economics and other degrees for the CEOs, Directors and Operating Performance factor group. 
 
 
Table 12:  Multiple Comparisons Using Factor Scores with the Scheffe Test 
Dependent 
Variable 
University 
Major 
(I) 
University 
Major 
(J) 
 95% Confidence Interval 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
PR FacScore2 - 
CEO, Directors 
& Operating 
Performance 
Accounting Management .3409121 .16208796 .222 -.1157796 .7976038 
Economics .4005613 .27019048 .534 -.3607151 1.1618378 
Others .4121774 .34225305 .694 -.5521393 1.3764941 
 
 
In summary, Hypothesis 3 was accepted.  Significant differences exist among the four different areas that 
Iranian auditors majored in at universities for the red flag factor group known as CEOs, Directors and Operating 
Performance.  As shown in Table 10, the results are explained by the three following statements: (1) Auditors who 
majored in Accounting perceived these red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than the auditors who 
majored in Management; (2) Auditors who majored in Management perceived these red flags as being more 
effective in detecting fraud than the auditors who majored in Economics; and (3) Auditors who majored in 
Economics perceived these red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than the auditors who majored in 
other areas.   This factor group, known as CEOs, Directors and Operating Performance, includes four Pressure red 
flags: (1) PR-2-1: Management and/or board directors holding significant financial interests in the entity; (2) PR-2-
2: Management and/or board directors have personally guaranteed significant debts of the firm; (3) PR-2-3: 
Recurring negative cash flows from operations or an inability to generate cash flows while reporting earnings and 
earnings growth; and (4) PR-2-4: Operating losses causing threat of imminent bankruptcy or foreclosure, or hostile 
takeover. 
 
 Two-thirds of the auditors surveyed majored in Accounting.  The results concerning the different majors of 
the Iranian auditors are summarized in the four following statements: (1) Auditors who majored in Accounting 
perceived the four Pressure red flags as having the highest fraud detecting effectiveness; (2) Auditors majoring in 
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Management perceived these red flags as having the second highest fraud detecting effectiveness; (3) Auditors 
majoring in Economics perceived these red flags as having the third highest fraud detecting effectiveness; and (4) 
Auditors majoring in other areas perceived these red flags as having the least fraud detecting effectiveness.     
 
Hypothesis 4:  Professional Demographic Factor – Auditors’ Accumulated Knowledge about Red Flags  
 
 In the fourth hypothesis, it is proposed that differences exist in the perceived level of effectiveness of each 
of the 36 red flags in fraud detection among the different levels of auditors’ accumulated knowledge about red flags.  
As a professional demographic factor, the various levels of knowledge about red flags accumulated by the Iranian 
auditors are classified into four different categories: (1) complete knowledge about red flags by 51 auditors, (2) 
limited knowledge about red flags by 106 auditors, (3) minimum knowledge about red flags by 28 auditors, and (4) 
no knowledge about red flags by 36 auditors.  The MANOVA, which used factor scores, is shown in Table 13.  As a 
professional demographic factor, the knowledge of red flags accumulated by auditors influences the perceived level 
of fraud-detecting effectiveness of two red flag factor groups known as: (1) Management Decisions and Market 
Changes, and (2) Management Involvement.  The 11 red flags were included in these two factor groups are all 
marginally significant. 
 
 
Table 13:  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Using Factor Scores 
Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F 
Value Sig. 
PR FacScore1 - Management Decisions & Market Changes 6.575 3 2.192 2.213 .088 
RA FacScore2 - Management Involvement 7.082 3 2.361 2.387 .070 
 
  
In Table 14, the Scheffe test, using factor scores, compares complete knowledge about red flags 
accumulated by auditors with the limited knowledge, minimum knowledge, and no knowledge about red flags 
accumulated by other auditors for the two factor groups: (1) Management Decisions and Market Changes, and (2) 
Management Involvement. 
 
 
Table 14:  Multiple Comparisons Using Factor Scores with the Scheffe Test 
Dependent 
Variable 
Knowledge 
(I) 
Knowledge 
(J) 
 95% Confidence Interval 
Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
PR FacScore1 - 
Management 
Decisions & Market 
Changes 
Complete 
Knowledge 
Limited 
Knowledge 
.2605483 .16959092 .502 -.2172834 .7383800 
Minimum 
Knowledge 
.0563062 .23406703 .996 -.6031905 .7158029 
No 
Knowledge 
.5174279 .21662775 .130 -.0929326 1.1277885 
RA FacScore2 - 
Management 
Involvement 
Complete 
Knowledge 
Limited 
Knowledge 
.3566129 .16947287 .222 -.1208862 .8341120 
Minimum 
Knowledge 
-.0704613 .23390409 .993 -.7294989 .5885762 
No 
Knowledge 
.3090329 .21647695 .566 -.3009028 .9189686 
 
 
The MANOVA, which used simple averages of factor groups, is shown in Table 15.  The different amounts 
of accumulated knowledge of red flags by auditors influence the perceived level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of 
four red flag factor groups, which includes 22 red flags that are all significant.  In Table 15, the two factor groups 
associated with the professional demographic factor labeled as the auditors’ accumulated knowledge about red flags 
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are as follows: (1) Management Decisions and Market Changes, (2) Organizational Structure and Controls, (3) 
Auditors and Managers, and (4) Management Involvement. 
  
  
Table 15:  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Using Simple Averages of Factors 
Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F 
Value Sig. 
PR FacAverage1 - Management Decisions & Market Changes 5.061 3 1.687 2.566 .055 
OP FacAverage3 - Organizational Structure Control 9.446 3 3.149 4.311 .006 
RA FacAverage1 - Auditors & Managers 5.814 3 1.938 2.903 .036 
RA FacAverage2 - Management Involvement 7.909 3 2.636 3.111 .027 
 
  
Table 16 shows that most of the significance is explained by: (1) the differences between auditors with 
complete knowledge of red flags and auditors with limited knowledge of red flags, and (2) the differences between 
auditors with complete knowledge of red flags and auditors with no knowledge of red flags.  The four following 
factor groups, associated with the professional demographic factor labeled as the auditors’ accumulated knowledge 
about red flags, are illustrated in Table 16: (1) Management Decisions and Market Changes, (2) Organizational 
Structure and Controls, (3) Auditors and Managers, and (4) Management Involvement. 
 
 
Table 16:  Multiple Comparisons Using Simple Averages of Factors with the Scheffe Test 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
Knowledge 
(I) 
 
Knowledge 
(J) 
 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
PR FacAverage1 - Management 
Decisions 
& Market Changes 
Complete 
Knowledge 
Limited Knowledge .2625 .13599 .295 -.1206 .6456 
Minimum Knowledge .0698 .18526 .986 -.4521 .5916 
No Knowledge .4364 .17512 .105 -.0569 .9297 
OP FacAverage3 - 
Organizational Structure & 
Controls 
Complete 
Knowledge 
Limited Knowledge .4112* .14333 .044 .0075 .8149 
Minimum Knowledge .2711 .19525 .588 -.2790 .8211 
No Knowledge .6118* .18457 .013 .0919 1.1317 
RA FacAverage1 - Auditors & 
Managers 
Complete 
Knowledge 
Limited Knowledge .3714 .13705 .065 -.0146 .7575 
Minimum Knowledge .1608 .18670 .863 -.3651 .6868 
No Knowledge .3886 .17648 .186 -.1085 .8858 
RA FacAverage2 - 
Management Involvement 
Complete 
Knowledge 
Limited Knowledge .3838 .15439 .106 -.0511 .8187 
Minimum Knowledge .0574 .21032 .995 -.5351 .6499 
No Knowledge .4602 .19882 .151 -.0999 1.0202 
 
 
In summary, Hypothesis 4 was accepted.  Significant differences among the four different amounts of 
accumulated knowledge about red flags by auditors exist for the four following red flag factor groups: (1) 
Management Decisions and Market Changes, (2) Organizational Structure and Controls, (3) Auditors and Managers, 
and (4) Management Involvement.   These four factor groups included 22 red flags which are explained in the 
following four paragraphs.  The four different amounts of accumulated knowledge about red flags by auditors are 
significant with respect to the level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of the red flags as perceived by auditors.    
 
For the Management Decisions and Market Changes factor group shown in Tables 14 and 16, the results 
are explained by the three following statements: (1) Auditors with complete knowledge of red flags perceived these 
red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than the auditors with minimum knowledge of red flags; (2) 
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Auditors with minimum knowledge of red flags perceived these red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud 
than the auditors with limited knowledge of red flags; and (3) Auditors with limited knowledge of red flags 
perceived these red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than the auditors with no knowledge of red flags.  
The seven Pressure red flags included in the Management Decisions and Market Changes factor group are: (1) PR-1-
1: High vulnerability to rapid changes in technology, product obsolescence, or interest rates; (2) PR-1-2: Excessive 
pressure on operating management or personnel to meet financial targets (sales and profitability incentive goals) 
exerted by board of directors and chief executive officers; (3) RP-1-3: Significant declines in customer demand and 
increasing business failures in the industry or overall economy; (4) PR-1-4: Need to obtain additional debt or equity 
financing of major research and development or capital expenditures to stay competitive; (5) PR-1-5: High degree of 
competition or market saturation accompanied by declining margins; (6) PR-1-6: New accounting, statutory, or 
regulatory requirements; and (7) PR-1-7: Significant portions of management’s compensation, represented by 
bonuses and stock options, being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for stock price, operating results, 
financial position, or cash flow. 
 
For the Organizational Structure and Control factor group as shown in Table 16, the results are explained 
by the three following statements: (1) Auditors with complete knowledge of red flags perceived these red flags as 
being more effective in detecting fraud than the auditors with minimum knowledge of red flags; (2) Auditors with 
minimum knowledge of red flags perceived these red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than the 
auditors with limited knowledge of red flags; and (3) Auditors with limited knowledge of red flags perceived these 
red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than the auditors with no knowledge of red flags.  The three 
Opportunity red flags included in the Organizational Structure and Control factor group are: (1) OP-3-1: High 
turnover of chief executive officers or board directors; (2) OP-3-2: Overly complex organizational structure 
involving unusual legal entities or managerial lines of authority; and (3) OP-3-3: Difficulty in determining the 
organization or individuals that have controlling interest in the entity.  
 
For the Auditors and Managers factor group as shown in Table 16, the results are explained by the three 
following statements: (1) Auditors with complete knowledge of red flags perceived these red flags as being more 
effective in detecting fraud than the auditors with minimum knowledge of red flags; (2) Auditors with minimum 
knowledge of red flags perceived these red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than the auditors with 
limited knowledge of red flags; and (3) Auditors with limited knowledge of red flags perceived these red flags as 
being more effective in detecting fraud than the auditors with no knowledge of red flags.  The eight Rationalization 
red flags included in the Auditors and Managers factor group are: (1) RA-1-1: Unreasonable demands on the 
auditor, such as unreasonable time constraints regarding the completion of the audit or the issuance of the auditor's 
report; (2) RA-1-2: Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting, auditing, or reporting 
matters; (3) RA-1-3: Domineering management behavior in dealing with the auditor, especially involving attempts 
to influence the scope of the auditor's work; (4) RA-1-4: Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that 
inappropriately limit his access to people or information or limit his ability to communicate effectively with the 
board of directors or the audit committee; (5) RA-1-5: A practice used by management of committing to analysts, 
creditors, and other third parties to achieve aggressive or unrealistic forecasts; (6) RA-1-6: Known history of 
violations of securities law, or claims against the entity, its senior management, or board directors alleging fraud or 
violations of securities laws; (7) RA-1-7: An interest by management in employing inappropriate means to minimize 
reported earnings for tax-motivated reasons; and (8) RA-1-8: Management failure to correct known reportable 
conditions in internal controls in a timely basis. 
 
For the Management Involvement factor group shown in Table 14 and 16, the results are explained by the 
three following statements: (1) Auditors with complete knowledge of red flags perceived these red flags as being 
more effective in detecting fraud than the auditors with minimum knowledge of red flags; (2) Auditors with 
minimum knowledge of red flags perceived these red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than the 
auditors with limited knowledge of red flags; and (3) Auditors with limited knowledge of red flags perceived these 
red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than the auditors with no knowledge of red flags.  The four 
Rationalization red flags included in the Management Involvement factor group are: (1) RA-2-1: Ineffective 
communication, implementation, support, or enforcement of the entity's values or ethical standards by management 
or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical standards; (2) RA-2-2: Excessive interest by management in 
maintaining or increasing the entity's stock price or earnings trend; (3) RA-2-3: Nonfinancial management's 
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excessive participation in the selection of accounting principles or the determination of significant estimates; and (4) 
RA-2-4: Recurring attempts by management to justify marginal or inappropriate accounting on the basis of 
materiality. 
 
Auditors with complete or limited accumulated knowledge about red flags represented 71 percent of all the 
respondents surveyed.   In contrast, auditors with minimum or no accumulated knowledge about red flags 
represented 29 percent of the all the respondents surveyed. 
 
Hypothesis 5:  Professional Demographic Factor – Have Auditors Used Red Flags to Detect Fraud 
 
 In the Hypothesis 5, it is proposed that auditors who have used red flags to detect fraud will have different 
levels of perceived effectiveness of each of the 36 red flags than auditors who have never used red flags to detect 
fraud.  In this Iranian study, usable red flag questionnaires were completed by 151 auditors who have used red flags 
to detect fraud and by 68 auditors who have never used red flags to detect fraud.  The MANOVA, which used factor 
scores, is shown in Table 17.  As a professional demographic factor, auditors who have or have not used red flags to 
detect fraud, influenced the perceived level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of four red flag factor groups which 
includes 20 red flags.  The four red flag groups are: (1) Management Decisions and Market Changes, (2) 
Listing/Debt Requirements & Profitability, (3) Organizational Structure & Controls, and (4) Auditors and Managers.  
Considering these four factor groups, 12 red flags are significant, and eight red flags are marginally significant.   
 
 
Table 17:  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Using Factor Scores 
Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F 
Value Sig. 
PR FacScore1 - Management Decisions & Market Changes 5.329 1 5.329 5.373 .021 
PR FacScore3 - Listing/Debt Requirements & Profitability 5.196 1 5.196 5.222 .023 
OP FacScore3 - Organizational Structure & Controls 8.617 1 8.617 8.983 .003 
RA FacScore1 - Auditors and Managers 2.916 1 2.916 2.903 .090 
 
 
The MANOVA, which used simple averages of factor groups, is shown in Table 18.  As a professional 
demographic factor, auditors who have or have not used red flags to detect fraud, influenced the perceived level of 
fraud-detecting effectiveness of three red flag factor groups: (1) Management Decisions and Market Changes, (2) 
Listing/Debt Requirement and Profitability, and (3) Organizational Structure and Controls.  These three factor 
groups include 12 red flags which are all significant. 
 
 
Table 18:  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Using Simple Averages of Factors 
Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F 
Value Sig. 
PR FacAverage1 - Management Decisions & Market Changes 3.899 1 3.899 5.904 .016 
PR FacAverage3 - Listing/Debt Requirements & Profitability 7.983 1 7.983 7.639 .006 
OP FacAverage3 - Organizational Structure & Controls 5.229 1 5.229 7.032 .009 
 
 
 Table 19 compares auditors who have detected fraud using red flags with auditors who have not detected 
fraud using red flags for the three factor groups: (1) Management Decisions and Market Changes, (2) Listing/Debt 
Requirements and Profits, and (3) Organizational Structure & Controls. 
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Table 19:  Pairwise Comparisons Using Simple Averages of Factors 
Dependent Variable 
Auditor 
Detect 
Fraud 
(I) 
Auditor 
Detect 
Fraud 
(J) 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
PR FacAverage1 - Management Decisions 
& Market Changes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
.287* 
 
.118 
 
.016 
 
.054 
 
.519 
PR FacAverage3 - Listing/Debt 
Requirements & Profits 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
.410* 
 
.148 
 
.006 
 
.118 
 
.703 
OP FacAverage3 - Organizational 
Structure & Controls 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
.332* 
 
.125 
 
.009 
 
.085 
 
.579 
 
 
In summary, Hypothesis 5 was accepted.  Significant or marginally significant differences between the 
auditors who have used red flags to detect fraud and the auditors who have never used red flags influenced different 
levels of perceived effectiveness of each of the 22 red flags included in the four following red flag factor groups.  
These four factor groups are: (1) Management Decisions and Market Changes, (2) Listing/Debt Requirements and 
Profitability, (3) Organizational Structure and Controls, and (4) Auditors and Managers.  As shown in Table 19, the 
auditors who have used red flags to detect fraud perceived these red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud 
than the auditors who have never used red flags to detect fraud for the three factor groups: (1) Management 
Decisions and Market Changes, (2) Listing/Debt Requirements and Profits, and (3) Organizational Structure and 
Controls.   The significant differences between auditors who have used red flags to detect fraud and auditors who 
have never used red flags to detect fraud in the three factors groups is explained in the following three paragraphs. 
 
For the Management Decisions and Market Changes factor group shown in Table 19, auditors who have 
used red flags to detect fraud perceived seven Pressure red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than 
auditors who have never used red flags to detect fraud.  The seven Pressure red flags in the Management Decisions 
and Market Changes factor group are: (1) PR-1-1: High vulnerability to rapid changes in technology, product 
obsolescence, or interest rates; (2) PR-1-2: Excessive pressure on operating management or personnel to meet 
financial targets (sales and profitability incentive goals) exerted by board of directors and chief executive officers; 
(3) PR-1-3: Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in the industry or overall 
economy; (4) PR-1-4: Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing of major research and development or 
capital expenditures to stay competitive; (5) PR-1-5: High degree of competition or market saturation accompanied 
by declining margins; (6) PR-1-6: New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements; and (7) PR-1-7: 
Significant portions of management’s compensation, represented by bonuses and stock options, being contingent 
upon achieving aggressive targets for stock price, operating results, financial position, or cash flow. 
 
For the Listing/Debt Requirements and Profitability factor group shown in Table 19, auditors who have 
used red flags to detect fraud perceived two Pressure red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than 
auditors who have never used red flags to detect fraud.  The two Pressure red flags in the Listing/Debt Requirements 
and Profitability factor group are: (1) PR-3-1: Marginal ability to meet exchange listing requirements or debt 
repayment; and (2) PR-3-2: Rapid growth or unusual profitability, especially compared to that of other companies in 
the same industry.  
 
For the Organizational Structure and Control Factor group shown in Table 19, auditors who have used red 
flags to detect fraud perceived three Opportunity red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than auditors 
who have never used red flags to detect fraud.  The three Opportunity red flags in the Organizational Structure and 
Controls factor group are: (1) OP-3-1: High turnover of chief executive officers or board directors; (2) OP-3-2: 
Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial lines of authority; and (3) 
OP-3-3: Difficulty in determining the organization or individuals that have controlling interest in the entity.  
 
Significant differences, between auditors who have used red flags to detect fraud and auditors who have not 
used red flags to detect fraud, existed for nine Pressure red flags and three Opportunity red flags.   More specifically, 
auditors who have used red flags to detect fraud perceived these 12 red flags as being more effective in detecting 
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fraud than auditors who have never used red flags to detect fraud. 
 
Hypothesis 6:  Professional Demographic Factor – Have Auditors Received In-House Red Flag Training 
  
In Hypothesis 6, it is proposed that auditors who have received in-house red flag training will have 
different levels of perceived effectiveness of each of the 36 red flags than auditors who have not received in-house 
red flag training.  In this study, usable red flag questionnaires were completed from 87 Iranian auditors who have 
received in-house red flag training, and from 130 Iranian auditors who have never received in-house red flag 
training.  The MANOVA, which used factor scores, is shown in Table 20.  As a professional demographic factor, 
the auditors who have or have not received in-house red flag training influenced the perceived level of fraud-
detecting effectiveness of three red flag factor groups: (1) Management Decisions and Market Changes, (2) 
Transactions, Accounts and Estimates, and (3) Auditors and Managers.   These three factor groups include 20 red 
flags which are all significant. 
 
 
Table 20:  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Using Factor Scores 
Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F 
Value Sig. 
PR FacScore1 - Management Decisions & Market Changes 8.691 2 4.345 4.412 .013 
OP FacScore1 - Transactions, Accounts & Estimates 6.169 2 3.085 3.135 .046 
RA FacScore1 - Auditors & Managers  16.885 2 8.442 9.069 .000 
 
 
The MANOVA, which used simple averages of factor groups, is shown in Table 21.  The auditors who 
have or have not received in-house red flag training have influenced the perceived level of fraud-detecting 
effectiveness of six red flag factor groups: (1) Management Decisions and Market Changes, (2) CEOs, Directors and 
Operating Performance, (3) Transactions, Accounts and Estimates, (4) Organizational Structure and Controls, (5) 
Auditors and Managers, and (6) Management Involvement.  These six factor groups include 31 red flags of which 
23 are significant and eight are marginally significant. 
 
 
Table 21:  Tests of Between-Subjects Effects Using Simple Averages of Factors 
Dependent Variable 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square 
F 
Value Sig. 
PR FacAverage1 - Management Decisions & Market Changes 7.217 2 3.609 5.532 .005 
PR FacAverage2 - CEO, Directors &  Operating Performance 4.584 2 2.292 2.537 .081 
OP FacAverage1 - Transactions, Accounts & Estimates 7.160 2 3.580 4.924 .008 
OP FacAverage3 - Organizational Structure & Controls 4.561 2 2.280 3.022 .051 
RA FacAverage1 - Auditors & Managers 12.138 2 6.069 9.562 .000 
RA FacAverage2 - Management Involvement 4.992 2 2.496 2.880 .058 
  
 
Table 22 compares auditors who have received in-house red flag training with auditors who have not 
received in-house red flag training for the five factor groups: (1) Management Decisions and Market Changes, (2) 
CEOs, Directors and Operating Performance, (3) Organizational Structure and Controls, (4) Auditors and Managers, 
and (5) Management Involvement. 
 
In summary, Hypothesis 6 was accepted.  Significant or marginally significant differences were found 
between auditors who have received in-house red flag training and auditors who have not received red flag training. 
Different levels of effectiveness of the red flags were perceived by auditors, and these red flags are included in the 
following six red flag factor groups: (1) Management Decisions and Market Changes, (2) CEOs, Directors and 
Operating Performance, (3) Transactions, Accounts and Estimates, (4) Organizational Structure and Controls, (5) 
Auditors and Managers and (6) Management Involvement.   For the six following factor groups, auditors who have 
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received in-house red flag training perceived these red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than auditors 
who have never received in-house red flag training as shown in Table 22.   The significant differences between 
auditors who have received in-house red flag training and auditors who have never received in-house red flag 
training are explained in the six following paragraphs. 
 
 
Table 22:  Pair-wise Comparisons Using Simple Averages of Factors 
Dependent Variable 
 
Training 
(I) 
 
Training 
(J) 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
PR FacAverage1 - Management  
Decisions & Market Changes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
.364* 
 
.110 
 
.001 
 
.147 
 
.582 
PR FacAverage2 - CEO, Directors & 
Operating Performance 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
.292* 
 
.130 
 
.025 
 
.036 
 
.548 
OP FacAverage3 - Organizational 
Structure & Controls 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
.282* 
 
.119 
 
.018 
 
.048 
 
.516 
RA FacAverage1 - Auditors & 
Managers 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
.438* 
 
.109 
 
.000 
 
.223 
 
.652 
RA FacAverage2 - Management 
Involvement 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
.297* 
 
.127 
 
.020 
 
.047 
 
.547 
 
 
For the Management Decisions and Market Changes factor group shown in Table 22, auditors who 
received in-house red flag training perceived seven Pressure red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than 
auditors who have never received in-house red flag training.  The seven Pressure red flags in the Management 
Decisions and Market Changes factor group are: (1) PR-1-1: High vulnerability to rapid changes in technology, 
product obsolescence, or interest rates; (2) PR-1-2: Excessive pressure on operating management or personnel to 
meet financial targets (sales and profitability incentive goals) exerted by boards of directors and chief executive 
officers; (3) PR-1-3: Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in the industry or 
overall economy; (4) PR-1-4: Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing of major research and development 
or capital expenditures to stay competitive; (5) PR-1-5: High degree of competition or market saturation 
accompanied by declining margins; (6) PR-1-6: New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements; and (7) PR-
1-7: Significant portions of management’s compensation, represented by bonuses and stock options, being 
contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for stock price, operating results, financial position, or cash flow. 
 
For the CEOs, Directors and Operating Performance factor group shown in Table 22, auditors who received 
in-house red flag training perceived four Pressure red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than auditors 
who have never received in-house red flag training.  The four Pressure red flags in the CEOs, Directors and 
Operating Performance factor group are: (1) PR-2-1: Management and/or board directors holding significant 
financial interests in the entity; (2)  PR-2-2: Management and/or board directors have personally guaranteed 
significant debts of the firm; (3) PR-2-3: Recurring negative cash flows from operations or an inability to generate 
cash flows while reporting earnings and earnings growth; and (4) PR-2-4: Operating losses causing threat of 
imminent bankruptcy or foreclosure, or hostile takeover. 
 
For the Transactions, Accounts and Estimates factor group shown in Table 22, auditors who have received 
in-house red flag training perceived five Opportunity red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than 
auditors who have never received in-house red flag training.  The five Opportunity red flags in the Transactions, 
Accounts and Estimates factor group are: (1) OP-1-1: Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, 
especially occurring close to year end that pose difficult “substance over form” questions; (2) OP-1-2: Assets, 
liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve subjective judgments or uncertainties 
that are difficult to corroborate; (3) OP-1-3: Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of 
business or with related entities that are not audited or audited by another firm; (4) OP-1-4: Domination of 
management by a single person or small group in a non-owner-managed business without compensating controls; 
and (5) OP-1-5: Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch operations in tax-haven jurisdictions for which 
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there appears to be no clear business justification. 
 
For the Organizational Structure and Control factor group shown in Table 22, auditors who received in-
house red flag training perceived three Opportunity red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than auditors 
who have never received in-house red flag training.  The three Opportunity red flags in the Organizational Structure 
and Control factor group are: (1) OP-3-1: High turnover of chief executive officers or board directors; (2) OP-3-2: 
Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial lines of authority; and (3) 
OP-3-3: Difficulty in determining the organization or individuals that have controlling interest in the entity.  
 
For the Auditors and Managers factor group shown in Table 22, auditors who received in-house red flag 
training, perceived eight Rationalization red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than auditors who have 
never received in-house red flag training.  The eight Rationalization red flags in the Auditors and Managers factor 
group are: (1) RA-1-1: Unreasonable demands on the auditor, such as unreasonable time constraints regarding the 
completion of the audit or the issuance of the auditor's report; (2) RA-1-2: Frequent disputes with the current or 
predecessor auditor on accounting, auditing, or reporting matters; (3) RA-1-3: Domineering management behavior 
in dealing with the auditor, especially involving attempts to influence the scope of the auditor's work; (4)  RA-1-4: 
Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that inappropriately limit his access to people or information or limit 
his ability to communicate effectively with the board of directors or the audit committee; (5) RA-1-5: A practice 
used by management of committing to analysts, creditors, and other third parties to achieve aggressive or unrealistic 
forecasts; (6) RA-1-6: Known history of violations of securities law, or claims against the entity, its senior 
management, or board directors alleging fraud or violations of securities laws; (7) RA-1-7: An interest by 
management in employing inappropriate means to minimize reported earnings for tax-motivated reasons; and (8) 
RA-1-8: Management failure to correct known reportable conditions in internal controls in a timely basis. 
 
For the Management Involvement factor group shown in Table 22, auditors who received in-house red flag 
training perceived four Rationalization red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than auditors who have 
never received in-house training.  The four Rationalization red flags in the Management Involvement factor group 
are: (1)  RA-2-1: Ineffective communication, implementation, support, or enforcement of the entity's values or 
ethical standards by management or the communication of inappropriate values or ethical standards; (2) RA-2-2: 
Excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity's stock price or earnings trend; (3) RA-2-3: 
Nonfinancial management's excessive participation in the selection of accounting principles or the determination of 
significant estimates; and (4) RA-2-4: Recurring attempts by management to justify marginal or inappropriate 
accounting on the basis of materiality. 
 
Significant differences between auditors who have received in-house red flag training and auditors who 
have not received in-house training existed for 11 Pressure red flags, eight Opportunity red flags, and 12 
Rationalization red flags.  More specifically, auditors who received in-house red flag training perceived these 31 red 
flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than auditors who have never received in-house red flag training. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
Conclusions 
 
 From accepting the first hypothesis, significant differences between external and internal auditors exist for 
10 red flags.  More specifically, external auditors perceived four Pressure red flags and six Opportunity red flags as 
being more effective in detecting fraud than internal auditors. 
  
 
 From accepting the second hypothesis, significant differences among the four different types of highest 
degrees (Associate, Bachelor’s, Master’s and Ph.D.) received by auditors exist for 10 red flags.   In general, the 
more educated auditors perceived seven Pressure red flags and three Opportunity red flags as being more effective in 
detecting fraud than the less educated auditors. 
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 From accepting the third hypothesis, significant differences among the different areas (Accounting, 
Economics, Management and others) that auditors majored in at universities exist for four red flags.  Differences 
among the college majors influence auditors to perceive each of four Pressure red flags to have a different level of 
fraud-detecting effectiveness.    Auditors who majored in Accounting as university students perceived the red flags 
to be more effective in detecting fraud than the other auditors who majored in Management, Economics and other 
areas. 
 
From accepting the fourth hypothesis, significant differences among the four different amounts of 
knowledge (none, minimum, limited and complete) accumulated about red flags by auditors exist for 22 red flags.   
In general, auditors with more accumulated knowledge about seven Pressure red flags, three Opportunity red flags, 
and 12 Rationalization red flags perceived these 22 red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than auditors 
with less accumulated knowledge about red flags. 
 
From accepting the fifth hypothesis, significant differences between auditors who have used red flags to 
detect fraud and auditors who have not used red flags to detect fraud, exist for nine Pressure red flags and three 
Opportunity red flags.   More specifically, auditors who have used red flags to detect fraud perceived these 12 red 
flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than auditors who have never used red flags to detect fraud. 
 
From accepting the sixth hypothesis, significant differences between auditors who have received in-house 
red flag training and auditors who have not received in-house training exist for 11 Pressure red flags, eight 
Opportunity red flags, and 12 Rationalization red flags.  More specifically, auditors who received in-house red flag 
training perceived these 31 red flags as being more effective in detecting fraud than auditors who have never 
received in-house red flag training. 
     
 In conclusion, the level of fraud-detecting effectiveness of each of the 36 red flags in fraud detection is 
influenced by the following six professional demographic factors: (1) type of auditors, (2) highest degrees received 
by auditors, (3) areas that auditors majored in at universities, (4) different amounts of knowledge accumulated by 
auditors about red flags, (5) auditors who have used and have not previously used red flags to detect fraud, and (6) 
auditors who have received or have not previously received in-house red flag training. 
  
Limitations 
  
 There may be two limitations in this study.  First, even though the questionnaire was pre-tested and validated, 
it is still possible that some misinterpretation of the questions may have occurred with the Iranian auditors surveyed.   
Initially, red flags are difficult for auditing professionals to understand and use in financial statement audits.   In the 
Iran study, the auditors may have had difficulty with interpreting the red flags, since the red flag questionnaire was 
translated from English to Iranian language.  Second, it is possible that the sample size of 227 auditors may not be 
representative of the entire population of external and internal auditors in Iran.   It is probable that the sample was 
too small and not completely random. 
 
Implications 
 
 Future implications would be to analyze the data collected from different countries and to compare the results 
among these different countries.  Future methodologies may include the following two procedures.  First, 
exploratory Factor Analysis may be performed to verify whether the data collected from different countries have the 
same structure.  Second, if the structures are similar, confirmatory Factor Analyses in a multi-group analysis may be 
conducted. 
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